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Overview 
Housing policy in Australia is overdue for a major renovation. 
Government tax and welfare policies, by favouring home owners 
and property investors over people who rent, are worsening the 
divide between Australians who own housing and those who do 
not. The divide is income-based and it is generational. While 
overall home ownership rates are stable or declining slightly, 
declines are much sharper among those with low-incomes or 
aged under 45. 
This report looks at our complex housing system as a whole. By 
quantifying the major government outlays on the private housing 
system, it reveals the cumulative impact of housing policies both 
on individual choices of where and how to live, and on productivity 
and inequality in our cities. 
Government subsidy of home ownership and property investment 
is skewed in favour of high-income households. They gain far 
more than others from tax concessions such as the land tax 
exemption on the family home, negative gearing and the capital 
gains tax discount. Much more government assistance is provided 
to buy investment properties than to buy a first home. 
Current policies are not producing more home owners. Because 
supply has been constrained, first home buyer assistance has not 
only failed to increase ownership levels but may have pushed up 
prices, benefitting sellers and making it harder for many 
households to own their first home. Policies that favour investors, 
such as negative gearing, increase demand for property and push 
up prices while doing little to increase supply.  
Combined with rules that restrict development in established 
suburbs, higher prices force many households to buy on the city 
fringes, with poorer access to transport and jobs. This reduces 
opportunities for individuals and makes it harder for businesses to 
access  skilled  workers.  It’s  a  rising  form  of  inequality  that  
damages productivity and the fair go. 
Winding back negative gearing and the capital gains discount 
would stop the artificial inflation of demand for investment 
properties and enable more people to buy their first home. 
Repealing stamp duty in favour of an annual property tax would 
greatly lower the cost of moving, making it easier to relocate for 
job opportunities, or to a more suitable home. It would also 
encourage the more productive use of land in our cities.  
Meanwhile, more people – one in four households – are renting, 
and renting for longer periods of time. The lack of encouragement 
for longer leases in Australian residential tenancy rules 
undermines stability for renters, many of whom have to move 
much  more  frequently  than  they  would  like.  Renters  don’t  receive  
anywhere near the direct government support that home owners 
and investors enjoy. Greater security for renters, such as longer 
minimum lease periods and notice periods before a lease is 
terminated, would give this large and growing group a better deal, 
without materially reducing landlord returns. 
At present, home owners profit from government outlays worth 
about $36 billion a year. Yet home ownership brings such benefits 
people  would  do  it  anyway.  Reform  won’t  – and  shouldn’t  – 
happen overnight. But we need to start the debate now.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Housing in Australia 
Housing is of paramount importance to almost all Australians, for 
good reason. Housing fulfils many objectives, from basic shelter, 
to the emotional security of a refuge where a family can be 
nurtured, to an asset against which it is possible to borrow. 
As well as being important for individuals and households, 
housing is important in a broader economic sense. The return on 
the stock of residential dwellings accounts for eight per cent of 
GDP.1 Dwelling construction and housing finance are vital 
indicators of economic performance. Land and transactions 
involving housing provide state and local governments with 
important tax bases. Housing is also central to monetary policy, 
with the effect of Reserve Bank (RBA) interest rate decisions 
flowing directly to mortgage holders. 
However, along with transport and infrastructure, what gets built 
where and who lives where shapes the structure and functioning 
of our cities. It affects how far people are able to live from jobs, 
and the number of potential employees that firms have access to. 
It also affects how well we are able to match our current housing 
stock  to  people’s  needs.  In  this  way  housing  affects  both  the  
productivity and fairness of Australian cities.2  
                                            
1 ABS (2012b) 
2 Kelly, et al. (2013) 
Figure 1.1: What kind of housing do people live in? 
 
Source: ABS (2013d) 
 
Despite  housing’s  critical role as economic infrastructure, which 
shapes the structure, productivity and fairness of our cities, no 
one part of government is tasked with understanding the 
complexity of the housing system. The Commonwealth is 
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rules and pension assets test rules. The states, meanwhile, 
charge land tax and also use stamp duty to raise revenue by 
taxing transfers of housing assets. Lastly, local governments 
collect municipal rates. 
‘Housing  ministers’,  where  they  exist,  generally  look  after  housing 
– in particular social housing funding and management – as an 
arm of welfare policy. This role is undoubtedly important, but such 
housing comprises only a very small, and declining, part of overall 
tenure (see Figure 1.1).  
1.2 What this report is about 
The complex relationship between housing policy and other 
issues is a major theme of this report. Given the importance of 
Australian cities to future productivity growth and the maintenance 
of the fair go, as well as to individuals and households, it is 
important to look beyond the noise of media coverage of housing 
and consider what is happening to housing as a whole. Our report 
asks: 
 What is happening to home ownership and private rentals?3 
 What do housing policies cost, counting both direct 
expenditure and tax breaks? 
 What effect do these policies have? Are there other side 
effects or unintended consequences? 
                                            
3 All  references  to  home  ‘owners’  include  outright  owners  and  those  still  paying  
off a mortgage. 
In making recommendations, we keep the following principles in 
mind: 
 All Australians should be able to enjoy a reasonable degree of 
housing security, irrespective of whether they own or rent. 
 Opportunities to own a home and build wealth should be 
expanded, rather than entrenched (including between 
generations). 
 Incentives such as taxes and subsidies should not restrict or 
discourage new housing supply. 
 Individuals and the economy should benefit from the most 
productive use of land in our cities. 
Because so many Australians own their own home, debate about 
the future of housing policy matters to millions of people and can 
be  very  sensitive.  Discussion  of  ‘housing  affordability’  is  a  clear  
example. Politicians talk repeatedly of the need to improve 
affordability for younger households. Yet a fear of falling house 
prices makes the much larger number of people who already own 
their home wary of any change that might push prices down or 
slow their growth.  
In any given year, roughly 120,000 people will become home 
owners for the first time. They would benefit from any policy that 
leads to lower house prices. But at the same time, over five million 
households (and eight million adults) already own at least one 
property.4 Policies that might result in lower house prices are not 
                                            
4 ABS (2013a) 
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in their interests. Former Prime Minister John Howard famously 
made this clear when he commented that he had never had 
anyone complain to him about the price of their house going up. 
In addition, for many people the family home is by far the 
household’s  most  valuable  financial  asset.  For  many  it  also  
houses their most valuable emotional asset, their family. 
Unsurprisingly, then, philosophers have long thought about the 
importance of property ownership, and the role of the state in 
defending it (see Box 1.1). 
The report does not take a view on an ideal level of home 
ownership in Australia, or whether people should own or rent.  
Nonetheless, home ownership rightly matters a great deal to 
many millions of people. Reform of housing policy settings is 
therefore a sensitive business, and it would be naïve to expect 
that change will be fast. 
Nevertheless, it is important to understand the costs and 
consequences of current housing policy. Change over time – 
accompanied by careful and gradual transition arrangements – is 
possible. But to succeed it must be accompanied by public 
discussion and understanding of the issues, and what they mean 
for individuals and society, and for the next generation and the 
ones after that. 
 
 
 
Box 1.1: Is property different? The political philosophy of 
home ownership 
A strong philosophical tradition considers property rights – 
including home ownership – to be somehow different from other 
rights. Writing at a time when widespread property ownership did 
not exist, John Locke (1632-1704) contended that property is a 
natural right, since it is derived from labour: “the  labour  of  his  body  
and the work of his hand, we may say, are properly his." The right 
to life is inalienable (we own our own bodies), as is property 
(which we have obtained through the labour of our body). For 
many, this connection to the essence of our humanity gives 
property rights (such as home ownership) a moral force.  
Pitt the Elder expressed this inalienability in 1767: “The poorest 
man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. 
It may be frail – its roof may shake – the wind may blow through it 
– the storm may enter – the rain may enter – but the King cannot 
enter – all his forces dare not cross the threshold of the ruined 
tenement.”  
The home is also a refuge to which we return from risk-taking 
forays into the outside world. When such entrepreneurial acts are 
productive, they create social benefits, and so property rights – in 
providing the security from which to act – are regarded as 
fundamental to the functioning of a prosperous society. 
Unlike his near contemporary Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), who 
argued that government was required to prevent “a  war  of  all  
against all,” Locke  regarded  the  raison  d’etre  of  government  to  be  
to protect individual property rights: the "great and chief end, 
therefore,  of  men’s uniting into commonwealths, and putting 
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themselves under government, is the preservation of their 
property.” Locke’s arguments greatly influenced the American and 
French Revolutions, in both of which the right to vote was tied to 
the question of property.  
Today many philosophers follow David Hume (1711-1776) in 
disputing the existence of natural rights, and consider that 
property rights exist because of (and to the extent that) the 
existing law, supported by social customs, secure them. 
1.3 What this report is not about 
The housing system is large and complex. This report therefore 
only focuses on some aspects of the system. Other parts of the 
system are important, but are not the focus of this report. 
The  report  looks  at  how  people’s  experience  of  different  kinds  of  
housing tenure is influenced by Commonwealth and state 
government policy settings, notably tax and expenditure settings, 
and residential tenancy legislation. It does not address policy 
settings that shape the market but with less obviously direct 
application to individual households, such as planning and zoning 
rules. Housing affordability and supply are strongly influenced by 
factors such as planning rules, construction costs and financing 
practices. These are all important issues, but they are largely 
beyond the scope of this report.5 Nor does the report look at 
social housing, which represents a relatively small share of overall 
housing stock and is increasingly targeted at households with 
complex needs.  
                                            
5 See Kelly, et al. (2011) for an analysis of these barriers to housing supply. 
Others have done much good work on these important issues, 
although more remains to be done. 
1.4 How this report is structured 
In Chapter 2 we look at home ownership in Australia. We consider 
its cost and benefits, look at how ownership rates are changing 
and at the main drivers of prices in the housing market.  
Chapter 3 looks at the private rental sector: how big is it, who is 
living in it and why, and what circumstances do they face?  
Chapter 4 looks at government housing policies and their effects; 
we assess how much tax and transfer policies are worth and to 
whom, and look at other consequences of government policy for 
productivity and fairness.  
Finally, Chapter 5 provides a conclusion and recommendations 
for an overdue renovation of housing policy in Australia.  
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2. Home ownership in Australia
This chapter considers the benefits and costs of home ownership, 
and asks what is happening to home ownership rates. It then sets 
out the main reasons why house prices have increased so rapidly 
since the mid-1990s  and  how  this  has  affected  households’  ability  
to buy a home. Finally, it considers how preferences for owning or 
renting may be changing. 
2.1 Why does home ownership matter? 
Home ownership and security of tenure provide private benefits 
and costs that accrue directly to individual households. Home 
ownership can also create public benefits and costs that accrue to 
the broader community. The costs of home ownership, financial 
and non-financial, are less often recognised but they can be 
significant for some households.  
Private and public benefits and costs often arise at the same time. 
Net private benefits encourage households to become home 
owners. Net public benefits are much more important in 
determining what role, if any, government should play in housing.  
At a basic level, a home provides shelter, comfort and a sense of 
identity, a place to withdraw from the outside world. In theory, a 
home can provide these benefits whether it is rented or owned. In 
practice, home owners have more control over their surroundings 
and situation than do renters. In Australia, it is generally easier for 
owners than renters to personalise where they live in line with 
their needs and preferences – by renovating, putting up pictures, 
gardening and owning pets, for example.  
Owners may feel a sense of achievement and psychological 
reassurance because they are part of the Australian majority in a 
country where ownership is considered normal, and anything else 
seen as requiring explanation.6 For many, home ownership is a 
touchstone of progress and prosperity. In this way, ownership can 
change the way a home is experienced. 
Ownership can enable households to reduce their future housing 
costs considerably, once their mortgage is paid off. Building 
wealth through housing equity also helps households to prepare 
for retirement.7 The safety net that home ownership provides, 
should people exhaust their retirement savings, benefits both 
retirees and the community.  
Owning a home helps households build wealth in at least two 
ways beyond the tax concessions for home owners discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
First, the owner-occupied family home can be used as collateral 
to borrow money at lower interest rates than those available to 
non-home owners. The ability of home owners to achieve higher 
returns from investments financed through debt helps build 
wealth. Second, taking on a mortgage is one way for households 
to commit to saving money and accumulating wealth, even though 
it is difficult to isolate whether taking on a mortgage changes 
                                            
6 Senate Select Committee on Housing Affordability in Australia (2008)  
7 Yates and Bradbury (2010) 
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behaviour, or merely represents households acting on a decision 
they have made to save and build wealth.8 
While home ownership can be a source of personal wealth, it also 
exposes households to financial risk. Buying a home can require 
households to put most of their savings and considerable 
leverage into one potentially volatile asset, reducing their ability to 
diversify risk. While returns to residential property as an asset 
class have been relatively stable in Australia, individual property 
values are more volatile.  
Owner-occupiers, on average, move less often than renters. A 
2010 survey found that 83 per cent of renters had moved at least 
once in the previous five years, compared to 28 per cent of 
owners.9 These greater levels of stability provide several benefits. 
Stability reduces the need for children to move schools, enabling 
them to build long-term friendships and for schools to better 
understand and respond to their needs. However, existing 
research is equivocal on the contribution of home ownership – or 
security of tenure – to  children’s  development.10 
Home owners are more likely than renters to be employed, though 
some research suggests that home owners’  relative  lack  of  
mobility can, over time, lead to higher levels of unemployment.11  
Australian research to date has only found evidence that home 
                                            
8 Andrews and Caldera-Sánchez (2011); Productivity Commission (2004) 
9 ABS (2010); ibid. 
10 Boehm and Schlottmann (1999); Haurin, et al. (2002);  Leventhal and 
Newman (2010) 
11 Blanchflower and Oswald (2013) 
ownership increases the chances of unemployment for people in 
regional areas.12 
Home owners appear to experience better health than renters.13  
There is also some evidence that security of tenure reduces 
stress.14 Yet a recent Australian study found that home ownership 
did not in itself improve mental health, only that happier and 
healthier people were more able to afford to purchase housing.15 
Living in a home for a long time is likely to promote civic 
participation because people want their community to be a good 
one to live in.16 Home owners are also likely to participate in their 
communities to protect and increase the value of their asset.17 But 
buyers seeking to buy into an area may be disadvantaged if 
existing home owners try to restrict new housing to increase the 
value of their assets. 
2.2 So is home ownership good or bad? 
While home ownership imposes some costs on households, the 
private benefits – especially the access to an effective form of 
savings and the ability to borrow against residential property for 
other investments – appear to be significant. Also important is the 
                                            
12 Flatau P., et al. (2004) 
13 AHURI (2002); Acevedo-Garcia, et al. (2004) 
14 AHURI (2005) .Note this study was of public housing tenants, who enjoy much 
greater security of tenure than renters but whose economic circumstances 
typically differ from home owners. 
15 Baker, et al. (2012) 
16 DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) 
17 Productivity Commission (2004) 
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stability and freedom ownership provides, compared to that 
experienced by renters under current rental settings. 
Given the large private benefits of home ownership, it is not 
surprising that Australia and many other developed economies 
have such high rates of home ownership. Indeed, it is likely to be 
highly attractive regardless of the level of government support for 
it, as Chapter 4 discusses.  
There is considerably less evidence regarding the net public 
benefits of high levels of home ownership. It may contribute to 
higher levels of public savings and the greater ability of 
households to provide for retirement. This is a public benefit 
because it eases budgetary pressure on governments but it is 
only worth targeting if the government savings it produces are 
greater than the cost of providing support to home owners. Public 
benefits are also likely to arise from greater stability. Given current 
rental settings in Australia, high levels of stability are tied closely 
to home ownership. 
2.3 What is happening to home ownership rates? 
After World War Two, home ownership increased dramatically in 
Australia: from 53 per cent in 1947 to 72 per cent in 1961. For 
several decades afterward it remained at or close to this level.18 
However, recent data puts the rate at 68 per cent, suggesting 
there has been a small decline (see Figure 2.1).19
                                            
18 Bourassa and Greig (1995); Yates (2011a) 
19 Eslake (2013) 
Figure 2.1: Historical home ownership rates 
Source: Eslake (2013); Advisory Council for Intergovernment Relations (1982 ); Kryger 
(2009); ABS (2012a) 
 
 
Australia’s  aggregate  home ownership rate hides large 
differences for different types of households. Differences based 
on age (Figure 2.2) and income (Figure 2.3) appear to be 
growing. 
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Figure 2.2: Home ownership rates by age cohort 
 
Source: Yates (2011a) 
Ownership rates have always been lower for younger households. 
Historically, home ownership rates have increased amongst each 
cohort as people age. While this general trend has persisted, 
since the 1980 and 1990s ownership rates have started to fall for 
all but the oldest households. The largest declines are among 
households in the 25-44 year bracket.20  
It has been much debated whether this decline is simply due to 
younger households deferring home purchase (just as marriage 
and childbearing have increasingly been deferred), or whether 
other factors are at work. If it is simply due to deferral, ownership 
levels can be expected to bounce back over time as households 
age, although these households will still spend longer renting than 
their predecessors. But the decline in ownership rates among 
middle-aged households suggests deferral is not the only factor. It 
seems  that  not  all  households  ‘catch  up’  over  time.21  
Beyond the small fall observed recently, Australia’s  overall  home 
ownership rate has remained fairly stable. As older households 
are much more likely to own a home, the ageing population has 
propped up ownership rates. But as the Baby Boomer generation 
passes on, this effect may weaken if falls in home ownership 
among younger households persist. The result may be a greater 
decline in the home ownership rate in the future.22 
Ownership rates also diverge based on household income. In the 
mid-1970s, rates across income groups were fairly similar. But 
there are now 25 per cent more home owners in the highest 
                                            
20 In recent years, the proportion of households that own their homes outright 
also declined from 42 per cent in 1994-95 to 31 per cent in 2011-12. ABS 
(2013d). Much of this decline is likely due to new mortgage finance 
arrangements, including redraw facilities. NHSC (2013) p 41. 
21 Yates (2011a) 
22 Flood and Baker (2010); NHSC (2013) 
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income quintile compared to the lowest income quintile (see 
Figure 2.3).23 
Figure 2.3: Home ownership rates by income quintile 
 
Source: Yates (2011a); additional data provided by Yates based on ABS 2011 census 
Finally, ownership rates vary depending on household 
composition. Couple households (both with and without children) 
have much higher rates of ownership than other household types, 
which is not surprising given their higher earning potential.  
                                            
23 Yates (2011a); additional data provided by Yates based on ABS 2011 census 
Ownership rates for these households have remained fairly stable 
over the last 30 years. In contrast, the ownership rate for single 
parent households is much lower and has fallen significantly, from 
60 per cent in 1981 to 49 per cent in 2011.24  
2.4 Are houses harder to buy? 
A common explanation for falling home ownership rates is that 
house prices are too high, especially in inner and middle ring 
suburbs in our capital cities. Indeed, discussion of housing policy 
is  often  driven  by  concerns  about  Australia’s  ‘housing  affordability  
crisis’.   
Between 1995 and 2012, real house prices grew on average by 
4.3 per cent each year,25 significantly outstripping growth in 
household incomes. The RBA estimates that the average house 
price rose from 2.5 times the average disposable household 
income in 1985 to 4.5 times the average disposable household 
income in 2012.26 This delivered a large increase in wealth to the 
roughly 70 per cent of households fortunate enough to own at the 
start of this period.
                                            
24 ABS (2013b) 
25 ABS (2013d). Based on median house prices. Between 1996 and 2003, real 
house prices grew 8 per cent per annum on average. In contrast, between 1970 
and 1996, real prices grew at an average rate of 0.8 per cent per annum. Fane 
and Richardson (2005) 
26 Kent (2013) 
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Figure 2.4: Real house prices vs. average weekly earnings 
 
Source: Yates (2011b) 
Focusing only on house prices, however, ignores the direct impact 
of falling interest rates on how much more households are willing 
to pay now than in the past.27 In  the  1970s  and  ‘80s,  Australia  was  
a high inflation economy. But inflation dropped dramatically from 
the early 1990s, when the introduction of inflation targeting 
allowed real interest rates to fall considerably. Greater competition 
among lenders lowered rates further. The RBA estimates that the 
                                            
27 Tumbarello and Wang (2010) 
decline in real rates allowed lenders to roughly double the size of 
loans relative to income without increasing the burden of 
mortgage repayments on household budgets.28 This led to a 
structural increase in house prices as buyers used their increased 
borrowing capacity to bid up prices over time.29 
But this explanation for house price growth since the mid-1990s, 
while important, is not sufficient. House prices are a function of 
demand and supply. As Figure 2.5 shows, several factors, 
including population growth, smaller households, higher incomes 
and more attractive tax rules for property investors, have 
increased housing demand. Supply has not responded as 
strongly, especially in established suburbs where development 
constraints are greatest.30 The mismatch between supply and 
demand has further pushed up real house prices. 
Australia has experienced more than two decades of economic 
growth. Unemployment has been low. Real wages and household 
income have grown strongly. The terms of trade boom, along with 
access to cheaper consumer goods, has freed up households to 
spend more on housing.31  
 
                                            
28 Ellis (2013) 
29 Ibid.; Productivity Commission (2004) 
30 Kelly, et al. (2011) 
31 Tumbarello and Wang (2010); Minifie, et al. (2013) 
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Figure 2.5: Selected house price drivers  
 
According  to  NATSEM’s  2013 Household Budget Report, over the 
last 25 years, household incomes grew 65 per cent more than the 
price of goods and services they consumed. As a result, the 
average household today is around $305 per week (almost 
$16,000 per year) better off than it was in 1988.32 
As households get wealthier, they also tend to spend a greater 
proportion of their income on housing. This has meant households 
now can, and will, spend more to secure larger, better quality and 
better located homes.33  
                                            
32 Phillips (2013) 
33 Productivity Commission (2004) 
Improving the size and quality of the housing stock pushes up 
prices. So does increased competition for houses that are closer 
to jobs, transport and amenities. Indeed, prices in inner and 
middle ring suburbs have grown much faster than in outer 
suburbs or on the fringe.34 According  to  the  RBA,  in  Australia’s  
four largest capital cities house prices within five kilometres of the 
city centre have grown by about two per cent a year faster than 
prices on the fringe.35 This reflects the increased value of land 
closer in. 
Tax changes have also increased housing demand by making 
investment property more attractive. The combination of capital 
gains tax rule changes in 1999 and negative gearing has strongly 
increased the demand for investment properties.36 Investors 
compete directly with potential homebuyers, particularly for 
established houses.37 This makes it harder for first home buyers 
to secure a property.  
 
 
                                            
34 Kelly, et al. (2013) 
35 Richards (2008) 
36 In 1999, the indexation rules used to adjust capital gains for inflation were 
replaced by a flat 50 per cent discount on capital gains. This made investments 
designed to produce medium-term capital gains, rather than a regular income 
stream, more attractive. Negative gearing allows investors to fully deduct costs 
associated with a rental property against their income, reducing their tax liability. 
37 Note changes to superannuation rules since 2007 have also made investment 
in commercial property in particular, but also residential property, more attractive 
to self-managed superannuation funds, further stimulating housing demand. 
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Why  hasn’t  supply  responded  to  strong  demand,  thereby  easing  
prices?  
Housing supply tends to adjust slowly to changes in demand, due 
to the many steps and constraints involved in building new 
housing stock. These include land release or rezoning, securing 
finance and approvals, construction and sales. Together, these 
contribute to a significant lag in the responsiveness of supply to 
increased demand. In some suburbs, the availability of land in 
which to build new stock is severely limited. As a result, increased 
demand for housing in these suburbs has a large impact on prices 
in those suburbs.  
Grattan  Institute’s  2011  report,  The  housing  we’d  choose, looked 
at barriers to supply.38 The only housing type that does not face 
major disincentives on the supply side is detached housing in 
greenfield areas. But new supply on the fringe is an imperfect 
substitute for housing closer to the centre and may only have a 
limited impact on prices closer in.39  
Governments’  role  in  increasing  housing supply has also changed 
greatly since the post-war period. Between 1947 and 1976, 
Commonwealth and state governments contributed more than 
20 per cent of the growth in housing stock. Then government 
contributions began to decline, both in proportional and absolute 
terms, and is now minimal. Policy has instead shifted to measures 
that inflate demand rather than increase supply. These include 
                                            
38 Kelly, et al. (2011) 
39 Productivity Commission (2004) 
assistance to first homebuyers and favourable tax treatment for 
investment properties (discussed in Chapter 4).40 
2.5 Impact on households 
For the 70 per cent of households that owned homes at the start 
of the price boom, the impact has been very positive. These 
households have enjoyed a significant, untaxed windfall gain from 
rising prices. They continue to benefit from house prices 
remaining high.  
On the whole, households that have bought more recently also 
seem to be coping reasonably well (see Box 2.1). To some extent, 
the fall in interest rates has moderated the impact of higher prices 
on household budgets. Indeed, as Figure 2.6 shows, mortgage 
repayments as a proportion of disposable income are relatively 
low compared to the last decade and are comparable to previous 
periods in the last 30 years.41 These averages inevitably mask 
ongoing challenges for lower-income households. 
                                            
40 Eslake (2013) 
41 Kent (2013) 
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Figure 2.6: Loan repayments as a proportion of disposable income 
 
Source: Kent (2013) 
Note: Housing loan payments calculated as the required payment on a new 80 per cent 
LVR loan with full documentation for the nationwide median-price home; household 
disposable income is before interest payments.  
Yet all this is little consolation to households that cannot raise the 
deposit needed to buy a first home or cannot secure a large 
enough mortgage based on their current income. As house prices 
have increased, so has the absolute size of the deposit required 
to obtain a mortgage. Yates (2011b) shows that for most of the 
1980s, a home buyer needed to have saved around the 
equivalent of a  full  year’s  average income in order to secure a 
loan they could comfortably repay that was still large enough to 
purchase a median priced dwelling. By 2010, the median house 
price had gone up so much that the corresponding deposit size 
had increased to roughly four times average annual income.42  
Prospective home owners clearly face more significant barriers 
than in the past. Government assistance to first homebuyers has 
largely failed to overcome the problem (see Box 4.3). Lower 
income households (and single income households) may find it 
particularly difficult to save a deposit without access to wealth 
from other sources, such as assistance from parents.43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
42 Yates (2011b).  Yates’  calculations  are  based  on  the  difference  between  the  
median house price and the amount a bank would be willing to lend a 
homebuyer based on a repayment rate of 30 per cent of the average annual 
income. Yates assumes a 25 year loan and standard bank variable rates.  
43 Ibid. 
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Box 2.1: Housing affordability  
A common indicator of affordability for home owners  is  ‘mortgage  
stress’,  measured  by  the  proportion  of  households  that  spend  
more than 30 per cent of their disposable income on repayments. 
Twenty-five per cent of households were under mortgage stress in 
2010, up from 18 per cent in 2001.44 
While some households clearly struggle with repayments, this 
measure ignores the fact that higher income households can 
choose to devote more of their income to repayments without 
cutting back on essentials.  
A more useful indicator focuses on households in the lowest 
40 per  cent  of  the  income  distribution  (the  ‘30/40  rule’).  In  this  
group only 8 per cent of households with a mortgage were in 
stress in 2010, little changed from 7 per cent in 2001.45  
Further, for many households, periods of mortgage stress are not 
persistent. One study found that less than half of all households 
that experienced mortgage stress between 2001 and 2005 were 
still in stress one year later, despite rising house prices and 
interest rates during this period.46 
Yet these indicators provide only a partial view of affordability. 
They do not reflect other costs related to housing (such as 
transport) or the appropriateness of a house (such as size and 
proximity to schools and employment). More importantly, they 
                                            
44 Rowley and Ong (2012) 
45 Ibid. 
46 Marks and Sedgewick (2008); Wood and Ong (2009) 
only reflect the financial position of households that have already 
bought. They say nothing about those that want, but cannot 
afford, to buy. 
2.6 Are preferences changing? 
It is a long accepted view that Australians overwhelmingly prefer 
to own, rather than rent, their home. But for most households, the 
ideal outcome is not the same as the best possible outcome in the 
circumstances. Decisions always require trade-offs.47 Whether a 
household buys a home depends not just on whether it can find 
one it can afford. It also depends on whether owning that home is 
preferable to renting elsewhere.  
In light of these trade-offs, a growing proportion of households 
may prefer to rent rather than buy. This seems likely for 
households that value the better access to jobs, schools and 
amenities that established inner and middle ring suburbs offer, but 
that cannot afford to buy a house in these areas.48  
It is difficult to identify the role that changing preferences might 
play in understanding the decline in home ownership rates.49 Yet 
anecdotal evidence suggests that preferences in favour of owning 
are becoming somewhat weaker among younger households.50 
 
                                            
47 NHSC (2013) 
48 Ibid.; Kent (2013) 
49 Yates (2011a) 
50 For example MacArthur Foundation (2013); Thompson (2012); Hurley (2012). 
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Box 2.2: Unoccupied housing and foreign investment 
Media commentary often questions the role of foreign investors in 
buying residential properties that may then remain unoccupied. 
Unoccupied dwellings include holiday homes, properties 
scheduled for redevelopment and homes that are between 
tenants. From 1996 to 2011, the proportion of unoccupied 
dwellings rose from 9.5 to 10.2 per cent (about 900,000 
properties).51 In NSW, Victoria and Queensland, the majority of 
unoccupied dwellings are outside capital cities. 
Foreign investors can buy residential property in Australia, subject 
to approval from the Foreign Investment Review Board. 
Temporary residents may only purchase one property as their 
place of residence. Foreign investors may only purchase 
established properties for redevelopment. New dwellings may be 
rented out. These rules are designed to encourage investment in 
new housing supply and to limit property market speculation.  
According to the RBA, recent annual property turnover rates have 
averaged about 5 to 6 per cent of the stock – about 450,000 
properties a year.52 In 2011, the foreign investment residential 
review approved 9,665 applications to purchase residential 
property.53 Using this as a yardstick, foreign investors are only 
responsible for around 1.5 to 2 per cent of the turnover in the 
housing market every year. In addition, they are only likely to own 
a small fraction of total unoccupied housing.
                                            
51 ABS (2012a) 
52 Schwartz, et al. (2006) 
53 Foreign Investment Review Board (2012) 
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3. Renting in Australia
More than 2.1 million Australian households – or one in four – 
rented privately in 2011-12.54 More than half (57 per cent) of all 
households renting in 2007-08 had been renting for more than five 
years, and a third (33 per cent) for more than ten years.55 
Portrayals of rental housing as a niche or transitional tenure 
before people pursue the  ‘Australian  dream’ of home ownership 
are therefore inaccurate. Renting is not just something that people 
do while saving for a deposit or studying.56 
Some households choose to rent. It gives them flexibility to move 
more quickly in response to job opportunities, and a strong rental 
sector is therefore essential to an increasingly mobile modern 
economy. Renting avoids many of the transaction costs that 
buying a home involves. It also enables a more diverse 
investment portfolio. Other households rent because they cannot 
afford to purchase a home. Social housing assists a small number 
of the most disadvantaged. But for many, rental is the only long-
term option. 
Whatever their motivations, renters miss out on many of the 
benefits of security of tenure that home owners enjoy. The 
difference in frequency of moving between owners and renters in 
                                            
54 This section focuses on households in the private rental market, not in social 
housing.  Unless  otherwise  specified,  in  this  section  ‘renting’  refers  to  renting  
accommodation through the private market. 
55 Stone, et al. (2013) 
56 For an example of changing norms, see Ferguson (2013) 
Australia is the highest in the OECD.57 Renters often say they 
would like to be able to personalise their housing to make it a 
longer  term  ‘home’, and to have more flexibility to have pets.58 
Identifying ways to increase security of tenure for renters – as 
other countries have done – is sensible, especially when home 
owners receive considerable taxpayer subsidies, in part so that 
they can access this benefit. 
Yet taxpayer support for investment in rental property through 
negative gearing and capital gains tax concessions has the 
opposite effect. By driving up prices and shaping a culture 
focused on capital gains, these measures hurt renters, while 
locking potential home owners out of the benefits of ownership. 
3.1 Renting is increasingly common  
Over recent years the proportion of households renting has 
steadily increased from around 18.4 per cent of households in 
1994-95 to 25.1 per cent of households in 2011-12.59 An 
increasing proportion of people in middle age and beyond 
continue to rent. Between 1981 and 2011, the median age of the 
                                            
57 Caldera-Sánchez (2011) 
58 rent.com.au (2011) 
59 ABS (2013d). Close to half the households in Australia were renting in 1947. 
ABS (1947) 
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head of renter households increased from 32 to 37 years (a much 
more dramatic increase than for the population as a whole).60 
Couples (with and without children) comprised about 45 per cent 
of renters in 2011. The profile of other renters has diversified. 
Between 1981 and 2011, single person households declined from 
40.4 to 25.0 per cent of all renters, while single parent households 
(6.3 to 16.0 per cent) and group households (4.2 to 10.5 per cent) 
increased.61 
Rental housing is more diverse in terms of structure than owner 
occupied housing. About 54 per cent of rental households – but 
85 per cent of owner occupiers – live in detached housing. About 
37 per cent of rental households live in medium density housing 
such as units, terraces, and blocks of flats of three storeys or 
less.62 
3.2 Renters face insecurity and instability  
A 2010 survey found that 83 per cent of renters had moved at 
least once in the previous five years, compared to 28 per cent of 
owners.63 While renters move for a wide range of reasons, overall 
they are moving much more frequently than they want to. In 
2007-08, 11 per cent of renters indicated they wanted to move in 
the next year – much lower than the 60 per cent who had actually 
moved in the previous year.64 Of those renter households who 
had moved home in the previous five years, 32 per cent 
                                            
60 ABS (2013b) 
61 Ibid. See discussion in Stone, et al. (2013) for further analysis. 
62 ABS (2012a) 
63 ABS (2010) 
64 Hulse, et al. (2011) 
characterised the move as forced or constrained, compared to 
11.1 per cent of owners and public housing tenants.65 
Renters want stability and security of tenure for the same reasons 
owners do. A stable location enables children to stay in the same 
schools, and households to stay connected with their family, 
friends and community. In contrast, moving frequently is 
inconvenient and expensive. It inhibits planning for the future, as 
does the ongoing threat of having leases terminated or not 
renewed. Low-income renters are especially vulnerable.  
Rents have increased substantially in recent years. From 
2002-2012, average nominal rents increased 76 per cent for 
houses and 92 per cent for other dwellings (mostly flats and 
apartments). Average nominal earnings increased 57 per cent 
and house prices 69 per cent over this period.66 
Many lower income renters struggle to afford their rent. In 
2009-10, 67 per cent of capital city renters in the bottom two 
income quintiles paid more than 30 per cent of their gross income 
in rent, and 31 per cent paid more than half their gross income in 
rent.67 Further exploration of this important issue is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
Most rental tenancies are governed by a six or 12-month lease, or 
on a month-by-month basis following the expiry of the initial lease. 
Regulatory settings are specified in state legislation, and there are 
no legal restrictions on longer leases. Low vacancy rates – 
                                            
65 Stone, et al. (2013) 
66 NHSC (2013) 
67 Ibid. 
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exacerbated by the pressure on many tenants to reach agreement 
and get a roof over their head in a short time – typically give 
landlords much more bargaining power than prospective tenants. 
As a result the length of residential leases in Australia is usually 
the legal minimum, giving landlords maximum flexibility to 
increase rent or sell the property. 
Even without a breach by the tenant, landlords can terminate 
leases on grounds such as moving in themselves or selling the 
property, generally with 30 to 60 days notice.68 In part this may 
reflect  investors’  favouring  of  capital  gains  over  rental  yields.  
Capital gains can only be realised by selling the property, so 
investors benefit from having as few constraints on selling as 
possible. 
In contrast, Australian commercial leases – even for small 
businesses and sole traders – typically involve longer terms and 
frequently include options to renew. Commercial property is also 
frequently sold to investors with a tenancy underway, whereas 
residential sales can be preceded by eviction of tenants. 
Along these lines, a 2008 Senate  inquiry  found  that  ‘leases with 
longer and more secure tenure can help generate social benefits 
attributable to home ownership.69 Many other countries have such 
settings in place. Figure 3.1 shows that in these countries longer 
lease terms, more narrowly defined reasons for eviction, and 
longer notice periods are common. 
                                            
68 Hulse, et al. (2011) 
69 Senate Select Committee on Housing Affordability in Australia (2008) 
Figure 3.1: Typical rental conditions in selected countries 
 
Source: Scanlon and Kochan (2011); Hulse et al. (2011) 
 
Moreover it appears that a shift to such arrangements can occur 
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periods increase in line with the length of the tenure. 
It is not possible to disentangle any effects these changes may 
have had from the dramatic impact the global financial crisis had 
on the Irish housing market. But there does not appear to have 
been any adverse impact on the supply of private rental housing: 
since the reforms were introduced in 2004 the Irish private rental 
sector has grown substantially as a proportion of all housing.70 As 
in Australia (and Germany), the Irish rental market is dominated 
by small individual investors.71  
3.3 Policy also limits renters’  capacity  to  ‘make  a  home’ 
Renters do not enjoy the same capacity  to  ‘make  a  home’ as 
owners, and typically can only make minor alterations at the 
discretion of the landlord.72 There are few rewards for tenants who 
improve their housing or devote time and money to keeping it in 
good condition.  
Many renters express a desire to keep pets for companionship.73 
But many landlords and property managers have blanket rules 
against pet ownership, even in circumstances where it presents 
little  or  no  risk.  Other  countries  do  not  so  severely  restrict  tenants’  
capacity to make a home. For instance, in Germany renters can 
ordinarily keep small animals and make small holes in the wall to 
hang pictures.74 
                                            
70 Ireland Central Statistics Office (various years) 
71 Ibid.; Hafner (2012) 
72 Hulse, et al. (2011) 
73 rent.com.au (2011) 
74 Hulse, et al. (2011) 
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4. Housing policies and their effects 
The first part of this chapter calculates the budgetary impact of the 
major housing policies that affect home owners, investors and 
renters. It also looks at which households benefit the most and 
which benefit the least from this expenditure. 
The report then turns from the private benefits created by 
government policies to the broader effects they have on 
productivity and inequality in our cities. 
4.1 Who benefits the most? 
Figure 4.1 shows how government expenditure – both direct 
expenditure and tax concessions – on housing policies is 
distributed among home owners, investors and renters.  
Expenditure on home owners, including tax expenditures (see 
Box 4.1), adds up to about $36 billion a year.75 Each household 
that owns a home benefits by about $6,100 per year, on average.  
Support for residential property investors costs $6.8 billion a year, 
or about $4,500 per year for each investor household.76 Together, 
home owners and investors receive more than 90 per cent of the 
benefits considered here. 
                                            
75 Tax expenditures, where possible use the methodology outlined in Yates 
(2009). Estimates of capital gains tax expenditures assume a 3 per cent 
per annum nominal growth rate in the value of residential property. Net imputed 
rent calculations use net imputed rent estimates supplied in the ABS (2013a) 
76 Based  on  Grattan’s  analysis  of  the  ABS (2013a) 
Figure 4.1: Annual government expenditure on housing policy 
 
Source: Grattan Institute analysis of ABS (2013a) Survey of Income and Housing 2011-12 
Note: The items in Figure 4.1 focus on annualised benefits. As the First Home Owners 
Grant is a one off payment, and is relatively small once annualised, it is not covered in this 
analysis. Estimates vary depending on assumptions and data sources. For consistency we 
use the Survey of Income and Housing 2011-12. See the Commonwealth Treasury Tax 
Expenditure Statement and individual state budget papers for alternative measures of tax 
expenditures. 
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Box 4.1: Measuring the value of tax concessions 
Policies such as the capital gains tax exemption and negative 
gearing impose costs on government. These are often determined 
by  calculating  the  ‘tax  expenditure’  – the cost of exempting 
particular types of taxpayers or activities from the normal tax 
rules. Tax expenditures (or  ‘concessions’)  are  like  a  subsidy  
provided via the tax system. 
Tax expenditures do not directly equate to the extra revenue that 
would be raised by removing a concession. Changing tax rules 
generally changes behaviour. As the Henry Review noted, there is 
considerable evidence that tax differences can have a large effect 
on the buying decisions households make.77 For example, 
reducing the capital gains tax discount on investment property 
might, in the first instance, increase tax revenue raised on capital 
gains but might also prompt investors to buy fewer properties and 
more shares instead. As a result, the impact of the policy change 
on total tax revenue is hard to predict. Nevertheless, tax 
expenditures are a useful measure of the value of a concession or 
benefit provided to the recipient. 
By far the two biggest winners from expenditure on housing policy 
are households that already own a home, followed by households 
that invest in residential property. Within both groups, the benefits 
flow more strongly to higher income households. This section 
looks in turn at the budgetary outlays that benefit these groups.78 
                                            
77 Henry, et al. (2009) 
78 The treatment of owner-occupied housing and rental housing under the GST is 
largely tenure-neutral and as such, is not covered in this report. 
Benefits to home owners 
Home owners benefit significantly from the exemption of capital 
gains on the family home, worth around $14 billion a year.79  
They also benefit from the non-taxation of net imputed rents, 
worth around $9.6 billion per year (see Box 4.2 for details). 
Should capital gains tax or a tax on imputed rents be introduced, it 
would be necessary to allow mortgage interest deductions for 
home owners as well. The figures presented in this report include 
the cost of providing this deduction as part of net imputed rent 
calculations. 
Exempting the family home from the assets test used to assess 
eligibility for the age pension provides home owners with a benefit 
worth about $7 billion a year.80 The pension assets test heavily 
favours owner-occupiers. For couples that own a home, the 
assets test caps financial assets (with the home exempted) at 
$279,000, after which the pension rate is reduced.81 Couples that 
do not own a home may have an additional $142,500 in financial 
assets before the rate reduces. This is a small concession given 
the level of median house prices – around $600,000 in Sydney.82  
 
                                            
79 Grattan analysis based on ABS (2013a) 
80 Daley (2013) 
81 Department of Human Services (2013) 
82 ABS (2013c)
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Box 4.2: Net imputed rent 
Net imputed rent is the term used to describe the value of housing 
services a home owner receives from their own home.  
Both owner occupiers and renters consume housing services. 
Renters pay for this service via rent to their landlord. Similarly, 
owner  occupiers  can  be  thought  of  as  paying  an  implicit  ‘rent’  to  
themselves as landlord (it is implicit since no money is actually 
transferred). 
Landlords pay tax on the rental income they receive from rental 
properties. In contrast, owner occupiers in Australia are not 
required to pay tax on their imputed rental income. This is an 
inconsistency in the income tax system.83 If owner occupiers were 
taxed on imputed rents, they would be able to deduct the interest 
costs of any mortgage on the property – that is, they would only 
be taxed on net imputed rents. 
A few countries, including Switzerland and the Netherlands, do 
tax net imputed rents.84 The value of the net imputed rent 
exemption in Australia is around $9.6 billion per year. The benefit 
to the average owner-occupied household is around $1,650 per 
year. 
While landlords are currently liable for paying tax on rental 
income, they pass part of the tax burden on to renters. Indirectly, 
this makes make owning the home you live in more attractive as 
you can avoid this tax burden. 
                                            
83 Andrews, et al. (2011b) 
84 Ibid. 
Pensioners that are owner-occupiers also receive a concession 
on their municipal rates (not covered in our calculations). The 
Victorian Government, for example, provides a pensioner 
concession valued up to about $200 and received by about 
420,000 individuals each year.85 Pensioners may also be eligible 
for stamp duty concessions.  
Land tax is levied by state governments on the unimproved value 
of land. The land tax exemption for the family home, the 
largest benefit for home owners provided by states, is worth a 
total of about $5 billion.86 
Governments provide a range of assistance measures to first 
home buyers. In 2009-10, an estimated $1 billion was provided 
through the First Home Owners Grant.87 State Governments have 
since targeted this assistance at new properties, significantly 
reducing total expenditure. We count this as a benefit for existing 
home owners, rather than households looking to buy. Due to lags 
in housing supply, the value of this assistance flows mostly to 
sellers, through higher house prices, rather than to buyers.88 
Stamp duty concessions for first home buyers produce similar 
results. Box 4.3 further discusses the impact of first home buyer 
assistance. 
                                            
85 Victorian Government (2012) 
86 Grattan analysis based on ABS (2013a) 
87 Yates (2012) 
88 Council of Australian Governments (2012) 
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Box 4.3: Assistance to first home buyers 
Over the last 50 years governments have put in place a range of 
measures aimed at improving affordability for first home buyers. 
Economist Saul Eslake estimates that these measures have cost 
over $22 billion since the 1960s. Despite this assistance, home 
ownership rates have declined since 1961.89  
Evidence suggests assistance to first homebuyers largely bring 
forward spending decisions rather than lifting ownership rates in 
the long run.90 Assistance is generally too small to overcome the 
deposit hurdle for many, and does little to help buyers meet 
regular mortgage repayments. States have begun to target these 
grants to new homes but untargeted Commonwealth grants 
remain. 
Benefits to investors 
Investors benefit primarily from two policies – negative gearing 
and the capital gains tax discount – which are worth around 
$6.8 billion each year.91 
                                            
89 Eslake (2013). Estimated value of assistance between 1964 and 2011 in 
2010-2011 dollars. State and Territory governments provided a further $3 billion 
in 2011-12 alone in the form of partial or total exemptions from stamp duty. 
Assistance measures have a variety of names, including grants, boosts, 
bonuses, tax concessions and savings accounts co-contributions. 
90 Council of Australian Governments (2012) 
91 Data from the ATO and the Commonwealth Treasury Tax Expenditure 
Statement suggest that the Survey of Income and Housing (SIH) may 
underestimate the cost of negative gearing. However, we use the SIH for 
consistency with our other calculations.  
Negative gearing allows investors to deduct losses made on 
rental properties from their other income, thereby reducing their 
overall annual tax liability. The discounted tax rate for capital 
gains means that an investor pays tax on only 50 per cent of any 
capital gains that are realised when an investment property is 
sold. 
Landlords may pass on some of the benefits of these concessions 
to renters through lower rents. However, the tight rental market, 
and the tight time constraints renters are often subject to when 
finding  a  home,  put  bargaining  power  in  landlords’  hands.  As  
result, investors are likely to capture the majority of benefits from 
these policies. 
Proponents of negative gearing assert that it promotes the supply 
of new homes and rental housing.92 Given the complexity of the 
housing system and the multiple factors influencing housing 
supply, direct evidence supporting or refuting this assertion is 
scant. But in June 2013, only 5 per cent of the money loaned for 
investment in housing went toward constructing new dwellings.93 
And vacancy rates are historically low,94 which the RBA has 
observed are indicative of a shortage of rental properties.95 These 
suggest there is very little justification for this government 
intervention that costs the budget around $2.4 billion per year. 
                                            
92 See, e.g. Property Council of Australia (2006) 
93 ABS (2013e) Encompasses lending for housing investment, not for purchase 
by owner-occupiers. 
94 Kearns (2012); NHSC (2013) drawing on Real Estate Institute of Australia and 
SQM Research data. 
95 Kearns (2012) 
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It is also often argued that abolishing negative gearing would 
discourage investment in new rental properties and thereby drive 
up rental prices, citing as evidence a spike in rental prices 
following  the  Hawke  Government’s  quarantining of negative 
gearing in 1986. However as economist Saul Eslake argues, this 
view is misguided. Figure 4.2 below shows what happened to 
rental prices and vacancy rates during this period. Only two cities, 
Sydney and Perth, experienced strong growth in rental prices. All 
other capital cities experienced no change, with Melbourne 
actually showing some slowing in rental price growth. Both 
Sydney and Perth experienced unusually low vacancy rates prior 
to the policy change, which is a more likely cause of the rent 
increases.96 
Moreover, the changes were introduced in September 1985, and 
across the two years they were in place lending for housing 
investment increased by 41.5 per cent.97 
                                            
96 Eslake (2013) 
97 ABS (2013e) 
Figure 4.2: Rental prices and vacancy rates, 1985-1989 
 
Note: Shaded area denotes the period (from July 1985 until September 1987) in which 
negative gearing was not available for property investments. Sources: ABS, Real Estate 
Institute of Australia via Eslake (2013) 
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exemption for the family home, the benefits are strongly skewed 
in favour of higher income households.  
As Figure 4.3 shows, the capital gains tax and land tax 
exemptions on the family home as well as the non-taxation of net 
imputed rent delivers $8,000 per year to households in the top 
income quintile, compared to only $2,800 per year to those in the 
bottom quintile.  
Tax concessions for residential property investors are worth 
$9,200 per year for households in the highest income quintile 
compared to $3,600 per week for the lowest income quintile.98 
Favourable treatment of owner occupied housing under the 
pension assets test does not follow this trend. Fewer higher 
wealth households receive full or part pensions since these 
households are more likely to exceed the financial assets test, 
even with their family home exempted. However, as Figure 4.4 
shows, around 40 per cent of expenditure on the age pension 
goes to households with more than $500,000 in net wealth. 
                                            
98 Grattan Institute analysis based on ABS (2013a) 
Figure 4.3: Annual benefits to home owners 
 
Source: ABS (2013a) 
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Figure 4.4: Age Pension expenditures by net wealth 
 
Source: ABS (2012c) 
 
Given the private benefits of home ownership discussed in 
Chapter 2, there are strong incentives to buy regardless of 
government support. Therefore, scaling back support, particularly 
to wealthy households, may have little impact on ownership rates. 
Well-targeted assistance may help households for whom home 
ownership is just out of reach but governments should only 
pursue this if the benefits of ownership outweigh the costs of the 
policy to taxpayers. If not, the funds would be better spent 
elsewhere (or not spent at all). 
4.2 Who benefits the least? 
Households that rent privately benefit least from the policies we 
costed. The main policy that benefits households in the private 
rental sector is Commonwealth Rent Assistance. It accounts for 
less than 6 per cent of the total housing benefits governments 
provide.99 It is only available to recipients of other welfare 
payments, such as the Newstart Allowance or the age and 
disability support pensions. On average, recipients receive around 
$2,900 each year. This payment is somewhat skewed in favour of 
lower income households. 
Commonwealth and state governments also spend around 
$5 billion each year on social housing.100 Although social housing 
is outside the scope of this report, we note that government 
additions to public rental stock are likely to benefit renters in the 
private rental sector by reducing rental demand.  
Those who do not own their home are excluded from the tax 
concessions and benefits provided to owners and investors. 
Unlike owner-occupiers, renters cannot access a highly tax 
effective vehicle for wealth creation – the owner-occupied family 
home. 
Perhaps the greatest disadvantage renters face comes from the 
pension asset test. Take, for example, two retired couples that 
seek the age pension. The first owns their home, which is valued 
at $800,000. They have $50,000 cash in the bank and no other 
                                            
99 There are a range of other government programs designed to support private 
renters. Due to the small size of these programs they have not been included in 
our calculations. 
100 Grattan Analysis of 2012-13 Commonwealth and State Budget papers. 
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assets or income stream. This couple is eligible for the full 
pension – currently $1,133 per fortnight.101 The second couple 
rents, preferring the flexibility. They have $800,000 saved in an 
investment portfolio and $50,000 cash in the bank. Despite having 
an asset portfolio of exactly the same value as the first couple, the 
second couple is ineligible for the full or part age pension.  
4.3 What does this add up to? 
Expenditure on housing policy most benefits households that 
already own a home, followed by households that invest in 
residential property. Within both groups, higher income 
households receive the greatest subsidies. 
Public subsidy of private decisions is reasonable when those 
decisions also benefit society more broadly, but we have seen 
that most of the benefits of home ownership are private, and 
those that are public are hard to pull apart from the benefits of 
security of tenure. Although insecurity of tenure is strongly 
associated with the private rental system in Australia, this is a 
feature of the current rental system rather than a difference 
between ownership and rental per se. 
It is also clear that housing policies increase the benefits of 
owning a home compared to renting, since renters cannot access 
any of the subsidies available to home owners. In addition, 
policies benefitting those who already own have, at the same 
time, made home ownership less attainable. 
                                            
101 Department of Human Services (2013) 
4.4 Who lives where affects productivity and opportunity 
Housing is often thought of as a primarily a social issue – whether 
everyone has a roof over their heads. But housing is also a vital 
part of our economic infrastructure, since a diverse supply of 
appropriately located housing is crucial to productivity. 
Grattan’s  2013  report,  Productive cities, showed that cities with 
well-functioning labour markets are more productive and provide 
residents with more economic opportunities.102 In a productive 
city, firms can access as wide a pool of potential employees as 
possible,  and  individuals  have  access  to  as  many  of  the  city’s  jobs  
as possible from their homes. Where workers and jobs are far 
apart and/or transport connections between them are poor, firms 
will have limited access to labour, and some people can end up 
locked out of opportunities to build skills and become more 
productive over time. 
The choices people have over where to live and work are affected 
by the location and type of housing stock in a city, and how easy it 
is to move between housing. These are explored below. 
These issues together affect what economists call the efficient 
use of land. Ensuring that land is put to its most productive, or 
highest value, use is important for a well-functioning city. At 
present,  the  cost  of  ‘holding  land’  through  owner-occupied 
housing is negligible: there is no disincentive to holding large 
amounts of land even if it could be put to more productive uses. 
To be used efficiently, land also needs to be transferred flexibly – 
                                            
102 Kelly, et al. (2013) 
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for cities to function well, households should not be locked in to 
their current housing arrangements. 
Housing stock 
Productive cities found  that  there  are  large  sections  of  Australia’s  
largest cities in which residents have very poor access to jobs 
within reasonable commutes.103 The report recommends 
improving transport links in cities and building a greater amount 
and variety of housing in existing suburbs. These changes would 
improve the functioning of labour markets, improve economic 
opportunities for residents and make our economy more 
productive. 
The  housing  we’d  choose  found that many Australians want to be 
able to make housing choices that do not exist in the current 
market. The report lays out a series of barriers to housing supply 
in Australian cities, ranging from conservative financing practices 
to planning restrictions and higher construction costs for medium 
and higher density housing.104 
The analysis in this report shows that government housing 
policies encouraging home ownership and property investment do 
not ameliorate this situation, since they mainly bid up prices of 
existing stock rather than stimulating supply of additional stock 
(see Figure 4.5). 
  
                                            
103 Ibid. 
104 Kelly, et al. (2011) 
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Figure 4.5: Housing policy and its consequences 
 
Note: The reasons that new supply does not adequately follow increasing demand for housing in established suburbs are analysed in Kelly, J-F., Weidmann, et al. (2011) 
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Moving house 
Stamp duty and pension asset tests create large disincentives to 
households moving.105 Australia imposes some of the highest 
transaction costs in the world on buyers and sellers of housing.106 
As a result, home owners are less likely to move than renters.107 
This has implications both for the matching of housing to needs 
and for the functioning of labour markets.  
By placing a large additional cost on buying and selling a home, 
stamp  duty  distorts  households’  choices.108 To avoid future stamp 
duty, first time buyers may buy a larger house than they need. 
Similarly, older households may avoid downsizing. Both lead to 
the over-production of large houses, taking up more land than is 
necessary, limiting space for housing in the inner and middle ring 
suburbs and pushing cities outward.109  
A UK study by the Spatial Economics Research Centre found that 
a two percentage point increase in stamp duty reduces household 
mobility by around 40 per cent in Britain. The study found that 
short distance moves were most affected, leading to the 
                                            
105 Davidoff and Leigh (2013) estimated that a 10 per cent increase in stamp 
duty was would lower turnover in the property market by 3 per cent after a year, 
and up to 6 per cent over a three year period. 
106 Andrews, et al. (2011a) 
107 Instead of selling and buying elsewhere, home owners could retain and rent 
out their existing home and rent in the new location instead. While this option 
might be financially attractive, weaker tenure security for renters reduces the 
desirability of this option. 
108 Henry, et al. (2009) 
109 Ibid. 
misallocation of dwellings, rather than having a large labour 
market effect.110  
Figure 4.6: Transaction costs for buyers and sellers across the 
OECD 
 
Source: Kelly, J-F., Breadon, et al. (2011) and  OECD (2011) 
 
In contrast to stamp duty, annual property taxes such as land tax 
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110 Hilber and Lyytikainen (2012) 
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by business, would also encourage land to be put to its most 
productive use and help to free up scarce land in inner and middle 
ring suburbs. Annual property taxes could also be used to enable 
society to capture some of the increase in property value created 
by public investment in transport and other infrastructure.112 The 
benefit of such investments on home values currently flows 
directly, largely untaxed, to individual home owners. 
The asset test for the age pension also creates a strong incentive 
for older households to hold most of their wealth in the family 
home. While downsizing might be a sensible option, providing 
housing better suited to ageing and requiring less maintenance, 
households that do so may have their pensions reduced or 
removed.113 
Together, the stamp duty and asset test rules lock in households 
to housing that may not be well matched to their needs. They 
make it harder for lower income (usually younger) households to 
buy a home in established suburbs. Many of these households 
are pushed to the city fringes, where job and other opportunities 
are more limited. Others will choose instead to rent closer in. But 
if they do, they miss out on the benefits of home ownership, 
                                            
112 Henry, et al. (2009) 
113 As part of the 2013-14, Commonwealth Budget, the Commonwealth 
Government introduced a trial program to allow pensioners to downsize their 
home without losing their pension entitlement. To qualify for the exemption the 
residence must have been owned for at least 25 years with at least 80 per cent 
of proceeds from the sale (up to $200,000) to be deposited into a special 
account. These funds (plus earned interest) will be exempt from pension means 
testing for up to 10 years. No withdrawals can be made from the account during 
this time. 
including greater security and government subsidies attached to 
owner-occupied housing. 
4.5 Housing policy also affects inequality 
Housing policy exacerbates, and could entrench, inequality 
between home owners and property investors, on the one hand, 
and  households  that  don’t  own,  on  the  other. 
Tax concessions benefit home owners and investors much more 
than renters. In particular, home owners have benefited from a 
significant largely untaxed increase in wealth due to the house 
price boom from the mid-1990s. This boom reflected significant 
increases in land values, particularly in inner and middle ring 
suburbs.  
Home owners have captured most of this wealth for themselves 
due to the capital gains and land tax exemptions on the family 
home. But, on the whole, these households did very little to create 
this wealth – the value of improvements, including buildings and 
landscaping, determine a relatively small proportion of a 
property’s  price.114 Rather, the wealth gain is largely determined 
by other factors like shops and parks, employment opportunities 
and government funded infrastructure investments and schools. 
While home owners benefit from increased house prices 
associated with these improvements, renters pay them through 
higher rents.115  
                                            
114 Henry, et al. (2009) 
115 Kevin  McCloud,  presenter  of  the  BBC’s  Grand  Designs, recently made a 
similar point:  “It’s  a  very  immoral  way  of  making  money  – you  haven’t  earned  it,  
you  haven’t  worked  for  it.  It’s  not  fair.  It’s  not  equitable.”  McCloud (2013) 
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Current housing policy also has longer-term implications for 
inequality. As noted in Chapter 2, rising house prices have had a 
negative effect on the ability of households to buy a first home.116 
Policies that favour investment in residential property also make it 
harder for households to buy their first home. Tax concessions for 
investors increase the demand for residential property and, given 
constraints on supply, contribute to rising house prices. To the 
extent this crowds out first home buyers, this undermines the 
governments’  objective  of  increasing  home  ownership. 
Households now require a larger deposit, creating a significant 
hurdle for those on a lower or single income. Many households 
would need to rely on other sources of wealth, such as assistance 
from parents, to raise a deposit to enter the housing market. Not 
everyone has access to such assistance. Providing assistance to 
children is easier for households that already own a home, 
especially those that received a windfall gain from recent house 
price rises.  
Of course, households that  don’t  manage  to  buy  a  home miss out 
on the range of tax concessions governments provide to owner-
occupiers. Over a lifetime, the discrepancy in tax settings leaves 
renting households at a significant disadvantage.117 In this way, 
government policies may be contributing to an increase in 
inter-generational inequality. 
  
                                            
116 Wood, et al. (2010)  
117 Ibid. 
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5. Conclusion and recommendations 
Government outlays on housing policy are large and they have 
large effects. Yet beyond a broad sense that home ownership 
should be encouraged, government objectives for housing are 
unclear.  
There are many good financial, social and personal reasons for 
people to buy housing. In fact, home ownership brings so many 
benefits that most people will want to do it anyway – they  don’t  
need a government subsidy. Despite the huge amounts 
government spend on subsidising home owners, aggregate 
ownership rates appear to have been more or less stable for 
decades, and are now declining slightly. In addition, these 
averages mask large declines in ownership among younger and 
lower-income households. Help for first home buyers has had 
negligible impact, besides pushing up prices and therefore 
benefiting sellers not buyers. Negative gearing and capital gains 
tax provisions mean that more assistance from government is 
available for buying second or third homes than exists for the first.  
These policies work to the greatest benefit of the already wealthy, 
while access to home ownership is harder than it has been for 
decades. Different generations face very different circumstances 
as a result. Meanwhile, renters – a large and growing proportion 
of the population – face the insecurity of short term leases, short 
notice periods and restrictive conditions.  
Housing  is  also  a  vital  part  of  Australia’s  economic  infrastructure,  
since a diverse supply of appropriately located housing is crucial 
to productivity. A better match between where people live and 
where they work, along with improved transport links, would 
improve both productivity and opportunity.  
All the government expenditure described in this report has done 
very little to improve the amount, location or diversity of housing 
supply. Using their limited funds to improve supply, along with 
addressing the many other barriers to supply, from planning 
delays to high construction costs in medium density building, is of 
vital interest to both Commonwealth and state governments. 
In Chapter 1 we identified principles that should inform a 
renovation of housing policy.  
 All Australians should be able to enjoy a reasonable degree of 
housing security, irrespective of whether they own or rent. 
 Opportunities to own a home and build wealth should be 
expanded, rather than entrenched (including between 
generations). 
 Incentives such as taxes and subsidies should not restrict or 
discourage new housing supply. 
 Individuals and the economy should benefit from the most 
productive use of land in our cities. 
These principles have driven our choice and design of the 
following recommendations. They do not cover aspects of the 
housing system, such as the importance of social housing or the 
need to increase the supply of affordable housing, that we have 
placed out of scope for this report. A comprehensive overhaul of 
housing policy would take these, and other issues, into account. 
Renovating Housing Policy 
Grattan Institute 2013 36 
These recommendations alone will not solve all of the issues 
related  to  housing  in  Australia’s  cities.  Recommendations  from  
previous Grattan reports, in particular those aimed at increasing 
housing supply in established suburbs and improving transport 
links, remain vital to creating fairer, more productive cities.118 
Making changes to housing policy will require early, deep and 
sustained public engagement of the type recommended in 
Grattan’s  report  Cities: Who Decides.119 Because land is limited, 
there is a complicated relationship in cities between the exercise 
of individual preferences and their collective outcomes. Public 
discussion about the trade-offs we face as households and as a 
broader community will be necessary for any change to housing 
policy settings to gain enough acceptance. 
5.1 The importance of transition  
Households make long-term decisions based on existing policy 
settings, including tax and welfare rules. Changes should 
therefore not be made lightly. Transitional arrangements should 
be put in place to provide households with time and opportunity to 
adjust. These could include incremental changes to settings over 
extended  timeframes,  the  choice  to  ‘opt  in’  before  changes  
become mandatory, and the grandfathering of existing 
arrangements for certain households.  
                                            
118 Getting the housing we want Kelly, et al. (2011) and Productive cities Kelly, et 
al. (2013) 
119 Kelly (2010) 
Box 5.1: Summary of recommendations 
Elimination of stamp duty and introduction of a broad-based 
annual property tax  
Stamp duties discourage households from moving to housing that 
better suits their needs. In comparison, annual property taxes 
such as land tax and municipal rates are less likely to distort 
households’  decisions.  They  also  distribute  the  tax  burden  more  
fairly. 
Reform of tax incentives for property investment  
Reforms to tax arrangements that favour property investment 
would help to reduce investor demand, easing pressure on house 
prices and making it easier for households on the margins of 
home ownership to buy a home. 
Reform of the private rental sector 
An inquiry should be established to take stock of the private rental 
sector’s  growth,  and  to  consider reforms that would offer tenants 
more stability and ability to personalise where they live without 
materially reducing the economic returns for landlords. These 
reforms could include extending the minimum duration of leases 
and  increasing  tenants’ freedom to make minor modifications and 
own pets. 
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Recommendation 1 – Elimination of stamp duty and 
introduction of a broad-based annual property tax 
Stamp duties discourage households from moving to housing that 
better suits their needs. Property taxes such as land tax and 
municipal  rates,  by  contrast,  are  less  likely  to  distort  households’  
decisions. 
Stamp duty should be replaced by an annual broad-based 
property tax levied by state governments. This would also replace 
the existing narrow land tax regime that exempts the family home. 
As  proposed  in  Grattan  Institute’s  2012  report,  Game-changers: 
economic reform priorities for Australia, the new property tax 
could be administered through the existing municipal rates 
system, which already has a much broader base than land tax.120 
Existing rates, which are set and collected by councils, could 
include a new state government component that applies to all 
properties, including owner-occupied housing, with no tax-free 
threshold.121 The  states’  component  should  be  based on a per 
square meter value, so that large investors are not disadvantaged 
and there are no incentives to subdivide land to minimise tax. 
Revenue should be returned to states to compensate for the 
repeal of stamp duties and the current land tax regime.122 
By putting a price on holding land, no matter its purpose, this 
reform would encourage land to be put to its most productive use. 
                                            
120 Daley, et al. (2012) 
121 In practice, this could lead to rates being collected centrally by a state 
government, with councils’  portions  being  redistributed  to  them.  The valuation 
base should also be standardised for the purpose of the new levy. 
122 Henry, et al. (2009) 
It would help to free up land in inner and middle ring suburbs. 
Depending on the level at which it is set, a broad-based annual 
property tax could capture some of the value created by public 
investment (for example, on transport infrastructure) that is 
currently largely untaxed as a result of the capital gains tax and 
land tax exemptions for the family home. Shifting from stamp duty 
to a broad-based property tax would also provide a more stable 
tax base for states and spread the tax burden more fairly. 
Implementation would need careful thought to avoid unfairly 
affecting households that have recently paid stamp duty. This 
could be dealt with in several ways. There could be a transition 
period in which rates are gradually increased while stamp duty is 
gradually decreased. Alternatively, the new regime could be 
restricted to properties that change hands during a transition 
period – these properties would be subject to the new level of 
rates but no stamp duty.  
Transition arrangements must also consider asset rich, income 
poor households, such as pensioners. These households could 
be allowed to convert higher rates into a charge against their 
property, which is repaid when the property is eventually sold. 
This would enable them to cope with higher annual rates without 
reducing their current living standards. 
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Recommendation 2 – Reform of tax incentives for property 
investment  
Reforms to tax arrangements that favour property investment 
would help reduce investor demand, thereby easing pressure on 
house prices and making it easier for households on the margins 
of ownership to buy a home. 
Chapter 4 showed that the two tax settings that have the most 
impact on investment in residential property are negative gearing 
and the discounted tax rate for capital gains. Negative gearing 
allows investors to deduct losses made on rental properties from 
their other income, thereby reducing their overall annual tax 
liability. The discounted tax rate for capital gains means that an 
investor pays tax on only 50 per cent of any capital gains that are 
realised when an investment property is sold. 
Reforms could limit the tax advantages for property investors by 
reducing the benefits of negative gearing, reducing the capital 
gains tax discount, or a combination of both.  
Economist Saul Eslake suggests changing negative gearing rules 
so that investment interest expenses can be deducted only 
against investment income earned in that year.123 Under his 
proposal, property investors would be unable to use losses on 
rental property to reduce their annual income tax liability. Any 
annual losses may be carried forward and used to offset a capital 
gains tax liability, but only when the property is eventually sold. 
This reform would reduce the attractiveness of residential property 
                                            
123 Eslake (2013) 
for investors by removing the annual tax advantage that arises 
from negative gearing.  
Alternatively, the capital gains tax discount could be adjusted. 
One option would be to return to the capital gains indexation rules 
that applied until 1999, when the 50 per cent discount was 
introduced. Compared to the discount, these rules created less of 
an incentive to seek short-term capital gains. 
Finally, reforms could be made to both negative gearing and 
capital gains tax rules as a package. For example, the capital 
gains discount could be reduced from 50 to 40 per cent for all 
investors. In addition, investors would only be able to deduct 
60 per cent of annual losses on rental properties from taxable 
income in any given year. This proposal, advanced in the Henry 
Tax Review, would also reduce the tax benefits of residential 
property investment, making it easier for first homebuyers to 
compete with residential investors.124  
These tax settings apply to other investment types as well as 
property. Since there is a strong argument for maintaining 
consistent rules across all investment types, the economy-wide 
impacts of any changes to these settings would need to be 
carefully considered. 
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Recommendation 3 – Reform of the private rental sector 
Renters are a large and growing group. Yet many do not 
experience stability and security. Many renters move much more 
frequently than they would like to; the difference in frequency of 
moving between renters and owners in Australia is the highest in 
the OECD. Renters also do not enjoy anywhere near the scope to 
personalise their housing and own pets that owners do. 
Residential tenancy legislation in Australia is a contributor to this 
situation,  together  with  low  vacancy  rates,  renters’  limited  
bargaining power and cultural factors (see Chapter 3). 
The Irish response to similar circumstances shows that changes 
to residential tenancy legislation that offers tenants a more secure 
and satisfying experience while ensuring rental housing remains 
an attractive investment are achievable. 
Establishing  an  inquiry  to  take  stock  of  the  rental  sector’s  growth,  
and of its increasing importance to households and the economy, 
would be a valuable first step. 
Reforms to consider would be to extend the minimum duration of 
leases, while still enabling renters to give notice and terminate 
their tenancy without paying out the entire lease. 
Other measures for an inquiry to consider include extending 
minimum notice periods that apply when landlords terminate a 
lease, and clearly prescribing grounds for termination. There are 
also  strong  grounds  for  increasing  tenants’  freedom  to  make  
minor modifications and own pets.125  
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